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Abstract- -Many issues still remain unresolved in control theory applications to economic policy- 
making. This paper discusses three of these issues. The first is related to target exogeneity: in 
economics, policy problems are often fornudated as target-orlented control problems, with target 
values established exogcaloualy. Some problems associated with target exogeneity and some ideas 
towards the development ofa themny of target fornmla~ion are surveyed. The second issue conceras 
the diatinctlca~ between manipulated and non-manlpulated variables. As opposed to enflneering 
control practice, where this distinction isdear and the effectiveness ofeach manipulated variable can 
be well established, in economics it is often unclear which manipulable variable is actuary used for 
policy and how effective it is; Granger causality tests are not always adequate to this purpose. The 
third issue relates policy effectiveness to the concepts of stochastic tr~ads and co-integration. To this 
regard, the paper discusses ome possible implications of co-integration  the time-series properties 
of nnlmown targets. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A considerable amount of literature has appeared, especially in the last decade, to describe and 
offer solutions to problems associated with the applicability of system control theory to economics, 
particularly to policy-making. For recent surveys and discussions on the developments of control 
theory for economic analysis, see [1-9]. Summarizing briefly, these discussions and surveys usually 
emphasize two distinct periods in the application of control theory to economics. 
The first period, apart from independent developments in [10-12] of a theory of the relationship 
between government instruments and desired targets, is characterized by a direct transfer of 
concepts and methodologies from the engineering literature to economic analysis. From the 
early works of Simon [13] and Phillips [14,15], applications to economics were investigated on the 
assumption that control theory, as developed in engineering, could be easily applied to economics, 
to solve such problems as optimal stabilization policies or optimal economic growth, or even such 
problems as the design of economic ontrol structures described, for example, in [16]. 
Reasons abound to justify this initial optimism. First, economists were encouraged to imple- 
ment a direct transfer of methodologies bythe proven ability of control theory to solve real-world 
engineering control problems atisfactorily. The engineering control iterature reports several 
examples of substantial improvements in the quality and accuracy of control of industrial pro- 
ceases, chemical plants, electronic systems, guidance systems, and so forth. Second, economists 
were interested in the insights offered by system control theory on the possible adverse ffects 
of feedback mechanisms in policy analysis, an issue which became specially sensitive in the 
early seventies as a result of the problems posed to policy-makers by abnormal oil price increases. 
Third, economists were intellectually attracted by the firm basis of applied mathematics onwhich 
control theory was developed, basis that offered some theoretical dvantages in determining, for 
example, the effectiveness of alternative policies under different conditions of uncertainty. 
The second period is characterized by a progressive departure of control theory, as applied to 
economics, from the engineering control iterature. This second period is customarily made to co- 
incide with the rational expectations "revolution," whose impact on economic analysis apparently 
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took away the optimism from transferring engineering practice into economics. The disillusion- 
ment, fueled by the poor impact of control theory on both the normative and descriptive aspects 
of policy-making, essentially came from recognizing the fallacy of treating economic systems as 
having the same properties of physical systems (for example, the property of passively reacting 
to control actions), and from recognizing that economic policy is, in fact, the result of strategic 
interactions between rational players (for instance, the policy-maker and the public). 
Undoubtedly, the study of policy-making has gained enormously in the past decade ~= as well 
documented by the cited references--from a game-theoretic approach to control theory. This 
has led to the conviction, widely shared in the economic profession, that the peculiar game- 
theoretic aspects of economic policy-making raise original issues, and therefore require original 
methodologies. However, without detracting validity from this statement, it should be noted 
that, in fact, a game-theoretic approach to control theory has long been at the center of many 
engineering applications, long before it became an issue in economics (see, for example, [17]). It 
seems, then, that what may explain the apparent limited impact of control theory in economics 
during the first period is not the inability of the methods developed by engineers to cope with the 
peculiarly distinct game-theoretic aspects of economic policy, but rather the naiv~t~ with which 
the analysis of economic systems before the rational expectations revolution was conceived and 
practised. Economists used to treat economic systems imilarly to passive physical systems not 
because of methodological restrictions coming from engineering, but as a result of the conceptual 
restrictions in which economic policy was studied at that time. Incidentally, it is not surprising 
that a similar naiv~t~ is now widely acknowledged with regard to the econometric practice of 
the sixties and early seventies, when little emphasis was given to the dynamics of the economic 
systems. For an interesting survey on this last topic, see [18]. 
This comment notwithstanding, a list of interesting theoretical developments in control theory 
for economic analysis includes the concept of time-inconsistency, as introduced into economics by 
Kydland and Prescott [19]; the problem of parameter dependence on policy changes, as empha- 
sized in [20]; the notion of reputation and credibility of announcements as a possible solution to 
the problem of time-inconsistency, as analyzed in a policy-making context by Backus and Drif- 
fil [21], Barro [22] and Tabellini [23]; and finally the practice of pooling rival models as a way to 
cope with the lack of knowledge about the true policy model, as described, among others, in [24]. 
Many problems are still open. The purpose of this paper is to discuss three unresolved issues. 
The first two are apparently well known but seldom considered in the literature; the third derives 
from some recent empirical findings in macro-econometrics. The first issue, discussed in Section 2, 
relates to the notion of target: most economic applications are viewed---similarly to engineering 
practice---as the solution of target-oriented control problems, i.e., problems in which policy is 
purposefully aimed at driving the economy towards a given exogenous set of targets. As opposed 
to engineering, however, this exogeneity of targets, and thus their implicit knowledge on the 
part of the public, the model builder or even the policy-maker, is not granted in economics: 
in some cases targets are unknown, or vaguely described; in other cases, they are determined 
endogenously through mechanisms whose description and analysis economists usually leave to 
political scientists; in other cases, they may be changed adaptively, depending on the state 
of the economy and on the effectiveness of previous policies. This paper surveys ome of the 
problems associated with target exogeneity, and surveys ome models of target formulation. 
The second issue is discussed in Section 3 and relates to the distinction between causality and 
manipulability. In engineering practice, the distinction between i puts to the system which are 
actually used for control and inputs which are left as disturbances is clearly determined, and the 
effectiveness of the control instruments in driving the system on target is well established. On 
the contrary, in economics it is often unclear which instrument is actually used for policy, nor can 
the effectiveness of each policy instrument be always established through Granger causality tests. 
Finally, the third issue, discussed in Section 4, relates to the well-documented observation that 
many macro.economic variables appear to be integrated of order one---that is, their changes are 
stationary. Within this framework, the paper discusses some possible implications of the concept 
of co-integration on the time-series properties of unknown targets. 
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2. TARGET EXOGENEITY 
The traditional approach to economic policy analysis is to assume that to determine optimal 
policies the policy-maker maximizes a social welfare function. This approach is consistent with 
standard economic analysis, whereby the agent's behavior is the result of selecting the most 
preferred alternative among a set of feasible alternatives. Within this view, the social welfare 
function represents social preferences over policies and outcome of policies. A vast literature xists 
on the structure of this welfare function, and even on the possibility of its existence or formulation. 
Ideally, the arguments of the social welfare function are the utilities of all present and future 
members of society, utilities which in turn depend on market allocations and government's actions. 
In practice, any attempt o formulate a full-fledged social welfare function rapidly escalates 
to levels of mathematical intractability, so that strong assumptions are needed to simplify the 
analysis. A typical example of such assumptions i  the representative agent assumption, whereby 
all members of society have identical utility functions, and the social welfare coincides with this 
single utility function. For some recent examples of applications of this simplifying approach, 
particularly in fiscal policy analysis, see [25,26]. 
A second approach--which will be the focus of this section--is to assume that the policy- 
maker establishes some target values for a set of macro-economic variables and determines the 
optimal policy consistent with these targets. In this case, the policy-maker optimizes a "macro 
welfare" function, whose arguments are typically the deviations of the actual values of the selected 
macrovariables from their target values. An example of a typical macro welfare function (see [27], 
for a discussion) is: 
oo 
L "- E E f f  [wl (~r,- ~)2 + w2(y,- y;)2] , (1) 
t=0 
where/~ is the discount factor, ~r and y are the inflation rate and output, and the asterisked values 
are the target which the policy-maker aims at, established exogenously. E is the expectations 
operator; in all models the policy-maker is assumed to be an expected utility maximizer. 
A great part of the theoretical work and the almost totality of the empirical work on control 
theory applications to economics make use of this '2arget-oriented" approach, which in fact offers 
a great deal of simplifications, and often allows manageable close-form analysis of optimal choices. 
However, apart from questions of consistency of the quadratic formulation in (1) with behavioral 
implications, one problem with this second approach is the implicit exogeneity of target values. 
This problem is not only present in the standard engineering-like approach of a single policy-maker 
controlling a passive economic system, but is also present in most game-theoretic applications 
(see, for example, [6,9]). Particularly, it is also present in the area of policy models that generate 
"political business cycles" (see [8], for a survey on this topic). Whether the model incorporates 
two or more parties, each with a different loss function, or two or more policy-makers, each in 
charge of a specific set of instruments (as in the models with a central bank independent from 
the executive), invariantly the loss function is formulated with a structure similar to (1). For 
example, in Alesina's [8] two-party model, the loss function of each of the two parties, labelled 
"D" and "R," is of the form (1): 
oo 
t=0 
implying that, although the target pairs (~r~, y~), i = D, R, may be endogenously formulated 
within each party, they still are exogenous to the economic modeling of optimal policies. Some 
literature on political business cycles leaves to political science the task of modeling the formu- 
lation of targets within parties, or within policy-makers in general. 
While target exogeneity is consistent with engineering practice, in economic analysis targets 
are in principle endogenous. Control actions in engineering are purposefully determined to the 
aim of driving a given system on target: it is the very specification of the target that generates 
the control problem; the optimality of choice is, in a sense, a secondary aspect of the engineering 
control problem. In economics, on the other hand, the emphasis is on the concept of rationality 
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of behavior, identified with optimality constrained to a specific set of feasibility. As the target- 
oriented control problem is one way of identifying the set of feasible choices, conditionally on 
target values, target values can be chosen optimally. For instance, at the optimum of the loss 
function (1), which represents preferences over policies conditionally on given target values, an 
indirect loss function function, L (~r~, y~), can be derived, which in turn represents preferences over 
targets. It follows that the formulation of a target-oriented control problem implicitly decomposes 
the overall policy problem into two parts: the selection of the optimal policy for given targets, 
through preferences represented by (1); the selection of the most preferred target values, through 
preferences represented by L (.). Thus, solving only the standard target-oriented control problem 
may be an incomplete policy exercise; in fact, it may lead to sub-optimal policies. The question 
then is how to endogenize into the economic model the choice of target values. Some approaches 
to this questionmnot allnecessarily in line with standard economic analysis--are briefly discussed 
here. 
The first approach is to interpret the traditional dichotomy between growth and stabilization 
as one instance of the decomposition f the overall policy issue into a target formulation problem 
and a target-oriented control problem. The latter, based on a loss function of type (1), defines a
stabilization problem, whereby the policy-maker attempts to keep some selected macrovariables as 
close as possible to predetermined target values, within the limits of irreducible randomness. The 
former coincides with an optimal growth problem, whereby the policy-maker--through theuse 
of a different set of policy instruments ~tablishes target values by selecting the most preferred 
time paths for the relevant macrovariables. The optimal stabilization policies affect he short-run 
dynamics of the economy; the optimal growth policies affect its long-run prospects. In standard 
economic analysis, these two problems are treated independently: the short-run properties of 
the economy do not affect, nor are affected, by the long-run prospects of the economy. This 
dichotomy is challenged on both theoretical nd empirical grounds. 
On empirical grounds, some recent literature has questioned the traditional separation between 
short-run/stabilization and long-run/growth, by emphasizing the possibility of cross-effects be- 
tween policies: stabilization policies may affect he long-run growth of the economy, and vice versa 
(see, particularly, [28,29]). The evidence isbased on the observation that relevant macrovariables 
appear to be better epresented asa stationary process around a stochastic trend, rather than 
a stationary process around a deterministic trend, as traditionally held in the literature. In the 
latter case, the implication is that any shock to the stationary process (the transitory component) 
does not affect he deterministic trend (the permanent component); in the former case, instead, 
a shock to the transitory component may affect in general the stochastic permanent component, 
and vice versa, thus mixing the effectiveness of both types of policies. This distinction bears 
fundamental consequences for policy. For example, in the case of output, any policy aimed at 
stabilizing the business cycle may affect, or may be affected by, policies aimed at output growth, 
according to whether output exhibits a stochastic or a deterministic trend component. (A vari- 
able exhibiting a stochastic trend component is said to be integrated of order one. See Section 4 
for further properties.) 
The possibility of cross-effects between policies is also consistent with some theoretical spects 
associated with the notion of decomposition. Optimization problems can be decomposed into a 
set of smaller, separate optimization sub-problems, provided that enough conditions are intro- 
duced to ensure that the optimum solution to the set of separate sub-problems is identical to the 
optimum solution of the overall undecomposed problem. In general, as a consequence of break- 
ing down the overall decision problem, interactions emerge among sub-problems; typically, the 
decisions pertaining to one sub-problem affect he performance function, and hence the decision, 
pertaining to another sub-problem. Two interacting sub-problems can be treated separately by 
introducing some suitable form of coordination. Coordination can take several forms, depending 
on how the interacting sub-problems are separated; for example, it may impose some modifica- 
tions or restrictions on the structure of the performance function of one of the sub-problems. If 
these modifications or restrictions are not taken into account, the two interacting sub-problems 
cannot be separated, hence, decomposing them yields suboptimal decisions. A vast literature on 
the general issue of decomposition and coordination has developed in systems engineering and 
operations research (see, particularly, the seminal work by Mesarovic et al. [30]), vast enough 
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to be beyond the scope of this paper. Yet the issue of decomposition and coordination does 
not appear to have been satisfactorily addressed in economic policy analysis. In our case, for 
example, it is an open question whether growth and stabilization can be viewed as two separate 
parts of the same overall policy problem; particularly, it is an open question whether the stan- 
dard formulation of the two problems is consistent with some form of coordination of the two 
interacting sets of policies. 
The idea of decomposing the overall policy issue into a target-formulation problem and a target- 
oriented control problem raises another important issue, the issue of complexity. Essentially, by 
the neoclassical paradigm of constrained optimality, if the policy-maker can solve the overall 
social welfare problem, there is no need for decomposition. Then, if decomposition is in fact 
observed in reality, it must be addressed as the consequence of some restrictions or some forms 
of structural incapability that impose to the decision-maker the adoption of the decomposition 
strategy as a tool to simplify the decision task. 
Addressing the issue of complexity--or equivalently of bounded rationalitymis becoming more 
and more common in economic analysis. Several forms of bounded rationality have been studied in 
the literature, and several models of behavior departing from the standard neoclassical rationality 
have been proposed in recent years (for a recent survey, see [31]). However, the analysis of 
the connections between complexity and economic policy is still at a very primitive stage of 
development. Three approaches will be briefly discussed here. 
One approach to complexity is to model the adoption of a decomposition strategy as a rational 
response of a neoclassical maximizer to a specific form of complexity--the form identified with 
transactions and decision costs. Facing costs of making and implementing decisions, the decision- 
maker breaks down the overall decision problem into a set of smaller sub-problems. The underly- 
ing idea is that the total cost of decision-making is reduced by solving each smaller sub-problem 
at different imes, according to an optimal staggered schedule which trades off suboptimality of 
decisions with the cost of making them. In our case, due to decision costs, the policy-maker 
breaks down the overall policy problem into a target-formulation problem and a target-oriented 
control problem, and focuses on solving each of them (and implementing the corresponding poli- 
cies) at different imes. For example, the policy-maker may focus on the stabilization problem 
more frequently than on the target-formulation problem. Some properties of this decomposition 
approach, and some problems related to its consistency with economic rationality, are discussed 
in [32]. 
Another approach to complexity is to model the adoption of a decomposition strategy as the 
response of a bounded rationality decision-maker who, by breaking down the overall decision 
problem into smaller sub-problems, gains the flexibility of choosing a mix of neoclassical and 
non-classical treatments of the different sub-problems. For example, the neoclassical pproach 
could be used for the target-oriented control problem, and a model of bounded-rationality for
the target-formulation problem. This would be consistent with the idea that stabilization, being 
largely a routine type of task, is more amenable to formal optimizations, while target formulation, 
viewed as more complex, is open to less formal alternative treatments. 
Within this framework, two models of bounded rationality for the target formulation problem 
have been proposed in the literature on economic policy. In one model, targets are formulated by 
the authorities through rules of thumb based on past experience, political bargaining, the state 
of the economy, etc. An example of this approach is found in [33], where target values are set in 
the policy model endogenously asa function of the state variables of the economy, but based on a 
"rule" which is exogenous to the model. In the second case, targets are formulated as the outcome 
of an adaptive process in which the policy-maker learns from past experience the reachability (and 
hence, the plausibility) of previously set target values, and adapts them to the new circumstances. 
An example of this model is given by the endorsement of GNP target values for the U.S. economy. 
Soon after the war, the US economy experienced a low rate of unemployment (1-2°~) for a few 
years; this figure, then, becomes the target values for stabilization policies. Later the economy 
evolved towards a rate of about 4% for several years, and correspondingly the perception of the 
target value for GNP shifted to this figure. Finally, in the eighties the rate stabilized at values 
of 6-7~, thus setting a new threshold for stabilization policies. 
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A third approach to complexity is to model the adoption of a decomposition strategy as the 
long-sighted response of a society which, by institutionally aaigning dit~ent asks to different 
governing bodies, introduces a system of check and balances. Along this line, an interesting 
direction of research is represented by models in which an independent central bank perfonm 
the task of reducing the magnitude of fluctuations in monetary policy induced by politically 
motivated parties (for an example of these models, see [8]). 
3. MANIPULABILITY AND CAUSALITY 
This section discusses the relationship between manipulability and causality. Manipulability is
used here to mean the ability of the policy-maker to affect an economic variable through changes 
of other variables. Causality is intended in the Granger sense, as defines and discussed in [34,35]. 
For a brief review of the concept of Granger causality, suppose that we are interested in asse~ing 
whether an economic time series zt "causes" another series Yr. In the Granger sense, zt causes Yt 
if it contains unique information about future values of yt that is not available in other economic 
time series. Thus, Granger causality is a relation of predictive power, conditional on specific 
information sets. Let J, be the information set containing past and present values of y~ and other 
economic variables, but not of zt. Let J~ be the set containing also past and present values of zt. 
J~ could also be the universal information set. Let /(Yt+, I J t) be the conditional probability 
distribution of y~+, given Jr. Then: 
(i) z~ does not cause Yt+, with respect o Jt if 
f(Y,+. I J,) = f (Y,+n i J~), 
that is, if the knowledge of the series x, does not change the conditional probability 
distribution of yt+n. 
(ii) zt is a "prima facie" cause of yt+. with respect o Jt i f  
f(Y,+- [ J,) # f(Y,+- I J~). (2) 
The qualification "prima facie" reflects the possibility that, by enlarging the information set Jt 
with inclusion of more variables, the causality of =t disappears. Of course, if zt does not cause 
yt+. with respect o Jr, it will not cause it with respect to any enlarged information set. 
To make these definitions operational, it is customary to restrict he attention to the first 
moment of the distribution, so that 
(iii) zt does not cause Yt+,~ in mean with respect o Jt if 
E [y,+. I J,) = E [y,+. I (3) 
(iv) zt is a "prima .facie" cause in mean of y~+. with respect to J~ if 
E I g,] # E [y,+. i (4) 
It is also customary to limit the definition of causality to the next-period value, Yt+l. Thus, 
definitions (3) and (4) applied to Yt+l will be simply referred to as "z Granger-cause y." It is 
important o note that if zt is a deterministic function of some series in Jr, then it does not 
cause y. 
This definition of causality is, of course, controversial. For a review of the issue, see [35,36] and 
the special issue on causality in [37]. The notion of Granger causality can be incorrectly used to 
indicate physical causation, leading to paradoxical cases of spurious causality, as for example, the 
case of lightning and thunder [35]: as lightning helps predict he occurrence ofthunder, lightning 
Granger-causes thunder, even if in fact the two events are generated by the same (unobserved) 
cause at different imes. Examples of this incorrect use of the notion of Granger causality are 
frequent in economics, especially in policy analysis where tests of Granger causality may be 
mlataken for tests of policy effectiveness (that is, of manipulability). 
To establish the relBtionship between manipulability and Granger causality, suppose that the 
true model of the economy is 
~t-" f(Z1,...,Xn), (5) 
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in the sense that any change in any variable ofX = (z l , . . .  ,z , )  changes y, but any change in any 
variable contained in the complement set of X does not. So, X is the set of "physical causation." 
The variables in this set are, for example, the variables that enter the agents' decision rule (in- 
come, unemployment, interest rate, etc.), the variables that enter the mechanism of expectations 
formulation, and so forth. (A parallel example from physics would be the variable "pressure" as 
a physical causation of the boiling temperature of liquids, since a change of the former affects 
the latter.) 
The concept of manipulability is obviously associated with X: a controller having the ability 
to set some of the z's at will has the ability to affect y. Instead, Granger causality is associated 
with the econometric model that economists can build for (5), of the type 
y = g (z l , . . . ,  + u, (8) 
where Z -- (zl, . . . ,  zm) is the set of exogenous observed variables, and u is a stochastic error which 
captures, inter alia, the effect of not observing some of the z's, the fact that g usually belongs 
to a restricted class of functions for mathematical tractability, the randomness introduced by 
aggregating over agents, etc. As the z variables are introduced in g (.) only on a purely statistical 
basis, Granger causality is obviously associated with the set Z. 
It is easy to see that the set Z does not contain the set X, nor is it contained in it. Thus, 
in general, Granger causality is not a sufficient nor a necessary condition for physical causality. 
Moreover, physical causality does not imply manipulability, as only some of the variables in X 
are in general available to the controller. 
An example of a variable of physical causation that is not present in Z is the case of common 
factors, as discussed in [38]. The decision rule (5) usually contains a number of agent-specific 
variables, such as age, occupations, education, location, sex, race, and a number of factors com- 
mon to all agents, such as interest rates, tax rates, publicly announced forecasts, etc. Under 
certain circumstances, when aggregating individual decision rules over the entire population, the 
statistical relevance of some individual factors may disappears. Thus, physical causality does not 
imply Granger causality. 
A case of a variable of Granger causation that is not present in X is the previous example of 
lightning and thunder. Note that this case of spurious causality due to the existence of a common 
cause can be revealed only because some extra knowledge is available to the investigator, i.e., 
the knowledge of the physical process of electrical discharge through the air. Similarly, some 
extra knowledge might be needed to explain non-trivial relationships between Granger causality 
and manipulability. Consider, for example, the case. cited in [39] in a different context---of the 
very high correlation between fathers' height and sons' height found by the biologist Francis 
Galton. The predictive power of father's height for sons' height entails that the former causes 
the latter in the Granger sense, and indeed this Granger causality can be related to physical 
causation through knowledge of genetic mechanisms. Moreover, in this case, Granger causality 
implies manipulability, as one may argue that by choosing a taller husband a woman increases 
the likelihood that her children will be taller too. So, the probability distribution of sons' height 
can be "manipulated." 
In general, if all the z variables not included in X were found to be caused by some subset of X 
(including some unobservable z's), Granger causality would imply physical causality. However, 
in target-oriented control problems a more restrictive notion than physical causation and ma- 
nipulability is used: the notion of reachability (and the related notion of controllability), as the 
existence of a sequence of values of the manipulated variables, such to bring the system output 
on target in finite time. Then, as reachability implies manipulability but not vice versa, it is 
easily seen that even in those cases where Granger causality implies manipulability, reachability 
is not ensured. On the other hand, as in the case of common factors, teachability does not imply 
Granger causality. 
The possible relationship between Granger causality and manipulability, and hence the pos- 
sibility of using Granger causality tests as tests of policy effectiveness, may be altered by the 
presence of feedback mechanisms. To discuss this issue, suppose that the true model of the 
economy is 
Yt = a Z/t-1 "~ b m~_ l  =~- czlt-1 =~- ut, (7) 
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where ut is a white noise disturbance, m~ and zt are inputs to the system, and lit is the varial>le 
to be controlled. Although inessential to the discussion, a specific economic exxm~le would be 
to view (7) as the relation between output (y), money (m) and employment (z), in a model in 
which output is determined by demand and supply factors, both in principle manipulable by 
the government. Suppose also that the public knows that the government is only using m as 
policy instrument, and not =. (Notice the time lag at which the inputs to the system affect the 
output: in (7) it is implicitly assumed that physicaJ causality cannot be instantaneous.) It is 
also assumed that the economy consists only of government and public, and that whatever action 
the government takes, it will not affect the structure of the economy. Finally, it is also assumed, 
without loss of generality, that if an agent observes the three series lh, mt and zt, the parameters 
of the economy can be estimated without error. 
Suppose the government has a target rt for ~, and determines at time t - I the value of the 
control mr-l ,  so to minimize the quadratic deviations from target. Then the optimal control is 
rf~t_ 1 = -b  - I  [a Y t -1  -l- C 2~t_ 1 -- r , -1 ]  , (g )  
where rt- i  indicates that the government knows the target for Zh at time t -- 1. By implement- 
ing (8) we get: 
y, = r,-1 + u,. (9) 
Note from (9) that output can be represented as a transitory white noise component around a 
term related to the target. Thus, whether business cycles can be viewed as short-run deviations 
of output from a deterministic trend or from a stochastic trend depends, in this bsmework, on 
whether the target series contaius deterministic or a stochastic trend. 
It is readily seen that without some randomness in the implementation of the control action, 
Granger causality test fail to detect policy effectiveness, asargued, for example, in [40--42]. As (8) 
is a deterministic relation, the control m cannot possibly appear as s Granger-cause of y to any 
agent having access to the information set {y~_j, zt_j, rt_j, j ~ I}. However, policy effectiveness 
can be restored by introducing an implementation error u2t-1 in the control action [43]. In this 
case ,  
mr-1 = -b  - I  [a lh-1 -I- c z t - i  -- r~-1] Jr u2t-1, (10) 
and, correspondingly, 
yt = rt-1 + b u2t-1 + ut. (11) 
Now mt causes Yt in the Granger sense with respect o the same information set as before, since 
it contains unique information about u2~-1, as seen from (10). 
The main conclusion is that, if a variable m is physically causing y and if it is indeed used 
for s feedback control action, there may exist circumstances in which Granger causality test 
fail to detect manipulability, and others in which these tests do not fail. If one knows which 
target the government is pursuing and which policy instrument is actually used, then it is not 
necessarily true, as claimed in some literature, that Granger tests convey no information about 
policy effectiveness. 
The conclusion, however, depends on the circumstance that the public (or the econometrician) 
knows at least which policy instrument is actually used by the policy-maker. Furthermore, this 
conclusion does not address a broader policy issue: how can an external observer, say the public, 
infer from the available observations--particularly f om Granger causality testsmwhether the 
economy is indeed under government control, and if so, which control variables are used and for 
which target. 
Suppose that the public observes the same information set available to the government, {Yt-j, 
zt_j, rt- j ,  mr-j ,  j >_ 1}. Then, the public can readily conclude that the economy is under control, 
by regressing the equation of the economy (7) and the feedback rule (10). However, it would be 
impossible for the public, in the absence of additioual knowledge, to infer whether the government 
is using mt or zt (or both) as control variables. With the given information, instead of (10), the 
public can estin~te the following feedback rule: 
b 
Zt -1  - "  --C -1  [a Y t -1  "[" b ra t -1  - r t -1 ]  - - u2t -1 ,  
c 
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and a Granger causality test would determine that zt causes Yt with respect o {Yt-j, mt_j ,rt_j ,  
j ~ 1), even if in fact the government policy instrument is mr. This example shows that even if 
a Granger causality test does not fall as a statistical tool, still it does not convey the type of in- 
formation about manipulability that one would expect in judging the effectiveness of government 
policies. 
Three different possibilities arise against he use of Granger tests as tests of manipulability: (i) 
when a specific variable m physically causes y, but the causal relation disappears when feedback 
control is applied; (ii) when a specific variable z physically causes y, but it is not the one used as 
control variable; (iii) when a variable is chosen as control variable to target a specific outcome, 
but in fact it does not physically cause that outcome. 
Finally, the possibility of using Granger causality tests to infer the existence of a purposeful 
government policy may depend on the knowledge of the target values. Suppose that the public 
observes all the variables of the economy, except he government target. Then the public estimates 
the model of the economy (7) and possibly the feedback rule: 
mr-1 = -b  -1 [a Yt-1 + c zt -1]  + ust-1,  (12) 
where now u3t is not necessarily a white noise process. Upon substitution, 
Yt ---- U3t-  1 "~" Ut, 
so that, with respect o the information set {yt_j,zt_j,j ~_ 1}, the series mt would still be seen 
as Granger-causing yz, since it contains unique information about u-~t. However, this type of 
Granger causality cannot be interpreted as a form of manipulability, because the public has not 
enough information to distinguish whether (12) is the result of a purposeful government action, 
or in fact it is simply an additional equation of the model of the economy, with the economy 
under no apparent control. When the public does not know the government target--provided 
there is one--positive Granger causality tests may not help to establish whether the economy is 
under control or not. 
4. CONTROL STABILITY AND CO- INTEGRATION 
Many important macro-economic variables are found to be integrated of order one (for exv~- 
pie [44]). A stochastic process is said to be integrated of order d, I(d), if it requires d differ- 
entiations in order to become wide-sense stationary. Conventionally, then, a stationary process 
is indicated with I(0), as it requires no differencing. Moreover, many macrovariables which are 
I(1), appear also to be co-integrated. Co-integration occurs when, for example, some particular 
linear combination of I(1) variables yields a stationary process. Note that, in general, an arbio 
trary linear combination of I(1) variables is also 1(1). (For further discussions on the notion of 
co-integration, see [45,46].) 
The purpose of this section is to discuss some implications of integration and co-integration 
on policy analysis. First, it is useful to briefly review some facts about integrated processes of 
order one. Stationary processes have bounded variance, have finite or exponentially decaying 
memory, and cross their mean value--say zero--in finite average time. If two I(1) processes, Yt
and rt, are co-integrated with co-integrating factor b---that is, the combined process Yt - b rt is 
I(0)--then, while Yt and rt wander around with only some very chancy crossing of the mean line, 
that particular combination crosses the mean line frequently. Thus, co-integration is naturally 
associated with the notion of dynamic equilibrium and stability in the economy: economic theory 
provides a reason for certain variables to be in equilibrium (say, Yt = b rt), hut in practice, these 
equilibria axe not attained at every period. 
Co-integration can also be naturally associated with the relation between outcome and target in 
a control problem, provided both variables are I(1): the variable under control is never precisely 
driven on target at every period, the deviation being, hopefully, a stationary random process. 
Equations (9) and (11) of the previous ection support his notion: if both yt and rt are I(1), then 
their difference under optimal control is a white noise process. Nickell [47] provides a broader 
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theoretical support for this notion, by considering optimal controls based on minimizing costs of 
adjustments, in addition to square deviations. 
In order to be effective, a control action must generate stationary deviations from targets. 
Based on this requirement, some necessary and sufficient conditions for the parameters of the 
model of the economy and the control rule can be derived, so that Yt and rt are I(1) but their 
difference is I(0) [43]. From the same requirement, it obviously follows that if the controlled 
variable is observed to be 1(1), then the target must necessarily be I(1) also. For example, since 
GNP appears to be 1(1), if the government is actually targeting GNP to the natural output 
value the value that potentially corresponds to the natural rate of unemployment--then the 
natural output value also should follow an I(1) process. This requirement, however, does not 
entail that the controlled variable be also co-integrated with the control variable. 
To examine further implications, consider the simple case in which the control rule is a linear 
function of current and past deviations only--in line with the early engineering practice of PDI 
automatic ontrol (proportional, derivative, integrative). For simplicity of notation, the model of 
the system contains only output and manipulated variables. Indicating with B the lag operator-- 
that is, yt-1 - B yt--the control scheme is described by the following equations: 
= P(B)  mr, (13) 
mt = C(B)(r t -~) ,  (14) 
where P(B) is the model of the economy and C(B) the control rule. P(B) and C(B) are 
polynomials in B, of degree p and c. From (14), the control action is exclusively function of 
present and past deviations from target. Rearranging, we get: 
= G(B) rt, mt =M(B)  ~, (15) 
where 
P(B) C(B) M(B) = O(B) (16) 
G(B) = I+P(B)  C(B)' I+P(B)  C(B)' 
that is, upon application of the control action both the control variable and the controlled variable 
depend only on current and past values of the target. 
From (15), it follows that any structural instability of the economy (any root of the polynomial 
P(B) greater or equal to one in absolute value) can be eliminated by designing a control rule 
C(B) such to cancel unstable roots from the product P(B) C(B). For example, if rt is I(0) 
and the policy-maker wants Yt to be I(0) as well, but the economic system has a unit root-- 
that is P(B) - Q(B)/(1 - B), with Q(B) stable :-then the choice of the control rule C(B) - 
(1 -  B) C'(B), with C~(B) stable, would stabilize the overall controlled system G(B), and make 
Yt an I(0) process. 
Suppose now that both P(B) and C(B) are stable, so that G(B) and M(B) are stable too. 
Then Za is I(1), if and only if rt is also 1(1). This result clearly follows from (15). Moreover, I", is 
I(1), if and only if mr is 1(1). Through the stationarity of C(B) and from (14), this result implies 
that rt - yt is I(1) as well; that is, in this case the target and the controlled variable are not co- 
integrated. Then, to achieve the required co-integration between target and controlled variable, 
the control rule C(B) must have a unit root, C(B) = C~(B)/(1 - B), with C'(B) stable. Thus, 
in this case, the controller manipulates--as  linear function of present and past deviationsmthe 
rate of change of the control variable, and not its level. Incidentally, the unit root in C(B) cancels 
out in both G(B) and M(B), so that rt, yt and mt are still I(1), but rt - Yt is now I(0). As 
an example, if the government targets GNP to its natural value through the budget deficit, then 
the simple Keynesian menu of increasing the deficit in periods of recession and decreasing it in 
periods of booms zeems consistent with this policy rule; i.e., the changes of budget deficits are a 
linear function of present and/or put  deviations of GNP from its natural value. Note, however, 
that under this control scheme the deficit will follow an integrated process of order one, and thus 
will cross its zero mean value in infinite average time. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper discusses three unresolved issues in control theory applications to economic policy- 
making. One issue is related to the notion of target, and to the prevalent practice of assuming 
economic targets exogenously to the system. Some ideas towards the development of a theory of 
target formulation are surveyed. A second issue concerns the distinction between manipulated 
and non-manipulated variables, and the evaluation of policy effectiveness. It is shown that cases 
arise where standard Granger causality tests fail to detect this distinction, or fail to detect 
whether the policy instruments used by the policy-maker are effective. A third issue relates 
policy effectiveness with the concept of co-integration. 
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